1. Bálint’s Syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception. Forthcoming. In Mind & Language.

  2. The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion. Forthcoming. In American Philosophical Quarterly. (With Lee Walters).

  3. Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. Forthcoming. In Phenomenal Presence, edited by Fabian Dorsch, Fiona Macpherson & Martine Nida-Rumelin, Oxford University Press.

  4. Idiosyncratic Perception. 2016. In The Philosophical Quarterly.

  5. The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism. 2016. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  6. Still Particular. 2016. Archived on PhilPapers.Org. (With Anil Gomes)

  7. On the Particularity of Experience. In Philosophical Studies (with Anil Gomes). Forthcoming.

  8. The Problem of Perception. 2015. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (With Tim Crane).

  9. The Problem of Illusion for Naive Realism. 2015. On the Brains Blog.

  10. Knowledge and Ways of Knowing. 2014. In The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

  11. Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. 2014. In a special edition of Ratio on The Structure of Perceptual Experience.

  12. Perceptual Experience and Seeing that P. 2013. In Synthese.

  13. Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?. 2012. In Theoria.

Reviews and Other Pieces

  1. Review of The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen. 2016. In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

  2. Pathology Based Philosophy of Mind. 2015. On the iCog Blog.

  3. Review of Objectivity and the Parochial, by Charles Travis. 2015. In Mind.

  4. Review of Berkeley’s Puzzle, by John Campbell and Quassim Cassam, and The Innocent Eye, by Nico Orlandi. 2015. In The Times Literary Supplement.

  5. Review of Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias. 2015. In Analysis.


  1. Visual Perception as a Means of Knowing. 2012. PhD Thesis, University College London.