Articles

  1. Naïve Realism, the Slightest philosophy, and the Slightest Science. Forthcoming. In Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind edited by Brian McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen. (With Ian Phillips)

  2. The Problem of Perception. 2021. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (With Tim Crane).

  3. Naive Realism, Representationalism, and the Rationalizing Role of Visual Perception. 2020. In Philosophical Issues.

  4. Austerity and Illusion. 2020. In Philosopher’s Imprint. (With Ian Phillips)

  5. How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience. 2019. In Philosophical Quarterly. (With Anil Gomes) [Published Version]

  6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments. 2019. In New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Casey Doyle, & Joe Milburn.

  7. The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion. 2018. In American Philosophical Quarterly. (With Lee Walters). [Published Version]

  8. Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. 2018. In Phenomenal Presence, edited by Fabian Dorsch, & Fiona Macpherson, Oxford University Press.

  9. Naive Realism and Diaphaneity. 2018. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. [Published Version]

  10. Bálint’s Syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception. 2018. In Mind & Language. [Published Version]

  11. Idiosyncratic Perception. 2016. In Philosophical Quarterly. [Published Version]

  12. The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism. 2016. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [Published Version]

  13. Still Particular. 2016. Archived on PhilPapers.Org. (With Anil Gomes)

  14. On the Particularity of Experience. 2016. In Philosophical Studies (with Anil Gomes). [Published Version]

  15. The Problem of Illusion for Naive Realism. 2015. On the Brains Blog.

  16. Knowledge and Ways of Knowing. 2014. In The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. [Published Version]

  17. Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. 2014. In a special edition of Ratio on The Structure of Perceptual Experience. [Published Version]

  18. Perceptual Experience and Seeing that P. 2013. In Synthese. [Published Version]

  19. Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?. 2012. In Theoria. [Published Version]

Reviews and Other Pieces

  1. Review of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau. 2022. In The Philosophical Review.

  2. Review of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. 2019. In Mind.

  3. Review of The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen. 2016. In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

  4. Pathology Based Philosophy of Mind. 2015. On the iCog Blog.

  5. Review of Objectivity and the Parochial, by Charles Travis. 2015. In Mind.

  6. Review of Berkeley’s Puzzle, by John Campbell and Quassim Cassam, and The Innocent Eye, by Nico Orlandi. 2015. In The Times Literary Supplement.

  7. Review of Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias. 2015. In Analysis.

Other

  1. Visual Perception as a Means of Knowing. 2012. PhD Thesis, University College London.